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Abstract
In this article, we study macroeconomic stabilization in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
using a dynamic game approach. With the aid of a stylized macroeconomic model, this article
analyzes the transmission and interaction of national ﬁscal policies and monetary policy of the
EuropeanCentralBank(ECB)intheEMU.Aspecialfocusisontheeffectsoflabormarketinstitutions
in the participating countries and of the introduction of ﬁscal stringency criteria like those imposed
in the Stability and Growth Pact.
The European Union (EU) countries started the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU)onJanuary1,1999. WiththeEMU,11EUcountriesreplacedtheirnational
currencies and national monetary policy autonomy with a common currency,
the Euro, and a common monetary policy that is designed and implemented
by the European Central Bank (ECB). Consequently, the monetary policy of
the ECB will be directed in principle at stabilizing aggregate—i.e., EMU wide—
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations and not at country-speciﬁc conditions. The pri-
mary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability in the EMU. Subject
to the condition that price stability is not endangered, a second target is the30 VAN AARLE ET AL.
stabilization of general macroeconomic conditions. A consequence of a com-
mon monetary policy may be that asymmetric effects result in cases where
countriesfacedifferentbusinesscycleconditionsorasymmetricstructuralcon-
ﬁgurationsoftheireconomies. See, e.g., HughesHallett, andPiscitelli(1999)for
a detailed analysis of such asymmetric transmissions of the common monetary
policy of the ECB.
Fiscal management, on the other hand, remains predominantly a national
competence under the EMU. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 and the Pact for
Stability and Growth, which was concluded in Dublin in December 1996 and
drafted with the Treaty of Amsterdam on June 16, 1997, advocate ﬁscal strin-
gency. The ﬁscal restrictions are motivated by fears that large ﬁscal deﬁcits will
undermine the credibility of the low-inﬂation commitment of the ECB, since the
ECB might eventually be forced to bail out insolvent governments in order to
prevent a collapse of the monetary and ﬁnancial system in the EMU. In addition,
high deﬁcits are likely to exert upward pressures on interest rates in the EMU.
In other words, high deﬁcit spending by one country could entail costs for the
other EMU members—costs that the spending country itself fails to internalize.
To prevent excessive ﬁscal deﬁcits, the Stability and Growth Pact introduces
ﬁnancial sanctions in case countries do not comply with its rules. The provi-
sions of this Pact advocate balanced budgets in the longer run and specify a
ceiling for deﬁcit spending of 3% of GDP for each EMU member. A violation
of the ceiling will trigger warnings and eventually penalties (unless exceptional
circumstances can be evoked).1
The EMU countries have given up the monetary policy instruments in the de-
sign of their macroeconomic stabilization policies. This loss by itself is likely to
increase the need for ﬁscal policy ﬂexibility when countries face a recession,
sincetheadjustmentburdenwillnowberelegatedtotheﬁscalpolicymaker. The
presence of (1) asymmetric macroeconomic shocks, (2) asymmetric transmis-
sions of symmetric macroeconomic shocks, (3) asymmetric transmissions of
the monetary policy of the ECB, (4) asymmetric transmissions of ﬂuctuations of
the Euro exchange rate, and (5) the absence of a sizeable federal ﬁscal budget
in the EU that would provide automatic stabilization in case a country is hit by
adverse conditions could be additional reasons why, in certain circumstances,
EMU countries would require a high degree of ﬁscal ﬂexibility at the national
level. Hence, under the EMU, situations may arise where the need for ﬂexibility
and the requirement of ﬁscal stringency are in conﬂict with each other.
Thevariousspilloversofnationalﬁscalpoliciesandthemonetarypolicyofthe
ECB may generate additional inefﬁciencies if the macroeconomic policymakers
implement their policies in a noncooperative manner. Demertzis et al. (1999)
point out that a perceived lack of accountability and the fact that the ECB is
confrontedwith11countriesthatpursuetheirindividualﬁscalpoliciesandlabor
market strategies could make it less likely that cooperative monetary and ﬁscal
policies will be implemented and sustained in the EMU. Unproductive conﬂicts
and mutually frustrating monetary and ﬁscal policies could result. IncreasingMACROECONOMIC POLICY INTERACTION UNDER EMU 31
the accountability of the ECB and improving commitment possibilities of the
policymakers could alleviate such policy conﬂicts under EMU if coordination of
monetary and ﬁscal policies fails to materialize.
The risks of instability in the EMU because of strict adherence to the Stability
and Growth Pact and uncoordinated macroeconomic policies have not always
been fully realized. In the light of these complications with monetary and ﬁs-
cal policymaking under EMU, an important issue is therefore the design and
implementation of macroeconomic stabilization policies under EMU.
This article analyzes, with the aid of a stylized macroeconomic model, the
design and interaction of monetary and ﬁscal stabilization policies in the EMU
using a dynamic game approach. We elaborate further the analysis of macro-
economic policy design in the EMU and the role of labor market institutions
therein. In particular, we add a complete modeling of the goods and labor
marketsthatfeaturerigiditiesintheshortrun, andstudytheiradjustment. Using
disequilibrium analysis, we make a sharp distinction between a Keynesian and
a (Neo-) Classical unemployment regime.
Macroeconomic stabilization in the EMU is modeled as a differential game
between the ECB and the ﬁscal authorities. We consider feedback informa-
tion patterns in the differential game of macroeconomic stabilization between
the ﬁscal authorities and the ECB.2 In addition, the effects of coordination of
monetary and ﬁscal policies in the EMU are analyzed. Cooperation allows in-
ternalization of the externalities and spillovers associated with macroeconomic
policy design in the EMU. These spillovers and externalities exacerbate out-
comes in the noncooperative feedback Nash case as the players try to shift the
adjustment burden to the other players. A comparison of the outcomes under
noncooperative and cooperative macroeconomic policies is made. In the set
of cooperative equilibria, we concentrate on the Nash bargaining case, which
appears to be the most realistic characterization of the bargaining problem
connected with cooperation.
The model also incorporates the stringency requirements on monetary and
ﬁscal policies associated with a conservative and independent ECB and the
Stability and Growth Pact, respectively. Since we include a complete modeling
of the labor market in the model, we can also address issues of labor market
institutions and labor market reforms in the EMU. In particular, nominal and
real wage rigidities play a crucial role in the model since they impact upon the
ability of the labor market to adjust to the equilibrium rate of (un)employment,
in particular under a situation of Classical unemployment.3 We consider the ef-
fects of asymmetric structures where we focus on asymmetries in labor market
institutions that may exist in the EMU.
Our analysis extends and complements the existing literature that models
macroeconomicpolicydesignintheEMU.Thisliteraturehasfocusedonvarious
related topics:
1. Macroeconomic adjustment and policy design in the transition towards EMU
with an emphasis on the effects of the monetary and ﬁscal convergence32 VAN AARLE ET AL.
criteria of the Maastricht Treaty. Von Hagen and Lutz (1995), Jensen and
Jensen (1995), and Barrell and Sefton (1997) are insightful examples that
address this convergence issue.
2. Comparing adjustment in the pre-EMU and in the EMU regime, with an em-
phasis on the likely costs and beneﬁts of a common currency. Currie et
al. (1992), Hughes Hallett and Vines (1993), Lane and Gros (1994), and Fair
(1998), among others, discuss this issue. In this literature, the question of
whethertheEMUislikelytoconstituteanoptimalcurrencyareaisaddressed.
It is argued that if macroeconomic shocks in the EMU will have a large asym-
metric component, if there are important price and wage rigidities, if labor
mobility is low, and if there is little automatic stabilization from a federal ﬁscal
budget, it becomes less likely that the EMU constitutes an optimal currency
area.
3. Problems of macroeconomic policy coordination in the EMU. Issues of
macroeconomic policy coordination and cooperation attracted a large in-
terest in the macroeconomic literature of the 1980s and 1990s. Petit (1979),
Bryant et al. (1988), McKibbon and Sachs (1991), and Nordhaus (1994), e.g.,
provide detailed discussions on macroeconomic policy transmission and
coordination in dynamic macroeconomic models. The coordination issue
concerns both the coordination between monetary and ﬁscal policy in the
national economy and the coordination of macroeconomic policies between
countries. Many of the issues and results in this literature apply also to
the EMU, which features one common monetary policy of the ECB and na-
tional ﬁscal policies of the individual countries. Under EMU, conﬂicts could
arise about the individual ﬁscal policies that countries are pursuing or about
how the national ﬁscal authorities and the ECB should adjust national ﬁscal
policies and the common monetary policy. Hughes Hallett and Ma (1996)
compare outcomes in the EMU under (1) coordination of monetary and ﬁs-
cal policies with (2) uncoordinated monetary and ﬁscal policies and (3) a
case where monetary policy is assigned to price stability and ﬁscal policy
to output growth. It is found that uncoordinated policies cause particular
problems in cases where countries are not symmetric. The ﬁscal–monetary
assignments can be problematic in case of symmetric countries.
4. The importance of labor market institutions and labor market reforms for
the functioning of EMU. The EMU countries are all characterized—although
to considerably varying degrees—by inﬂexible labor markets that feature
wage rigidities and considerable structural unemployment due to institu-
tional rigidities and skill mismatches. An important question, consequently,
is how the EMU will function in the presence of such imperfections in the
labor market and if labor market reforms will succeed in increasing labor
market ﬂexibility. Empirical work by Demertzis and Hughes Hallett (1998)
ﬁnds that the combination of asymmetric shocks, asymmetric labor market
institutions, and asymmetric transmission mechanisms has led to increas-
ingly divergent structures in the EU that may produce large inefﬁciencies ifMACROECONOMIC POLICY INTERACTION UNDER EMU 33
common policies are pursued. Agell (1999) argues that not all labor market
rigidities are equally damaging to unemployment and that there are consid-
erable differences in the effects across OECD countries. This result also
explains why some labor market reforms will work in some cases but not in
other cases. Calmfors (1998) and Bertold and Fehn (1998) address the ques-
tion of whether the EMU could affect the incentives to undertake structural
labor market reforms inside the EMU and in small countries outside the EMU
but with strong ties to the EMU. Against the widely held view that the EMU
could promote labor market reforms, their game-theoretic analysis argues
thatEMUmayreducetheincentivestoundertakelabormarketreformsinthe
EMU but may increase reform in small countries outside the EMU. The result
depends very much, however, on the speciﬁc character of the model, which
concentrates on the credibility problem of monetary policy. Compared to
national monetary policies, the ECB will be less responsive to an achieved
reduction in the structural unemployment level by a labor market reform in
a country. Therefore, they argue, incentives to undertake such reforms are
reduced in EMU countries.
The outline of the article is as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple dynamic
macroeconomic model of the EMU. The interaction and transmission of ﬁscal
policies and monetary policy implemented by the ECB are studied to illustrate
the most important aspects of the model. The roles of labor market institutions
andofﬁscalstringencyrequirementsareconsidered. Section3considerssome
theoretical issues concerning the (noncooperative) feedback Nash equilibrium
and the calculation of the (cooperative) Nash bargaining solution of the dy-
namic stabilization game that is seen to occur in the EMU. Section 4 studies a
numerical example, and Section 5 concludes.
1. Macroeconomic stabilization policies in the EMU
To model macroeconomic adjustment and the possible dynamic stabilization
conﬂicts that may arise in EMU between monetary and ﬁscal policies, we ex-
tend a recently developed approach by Neck and Dockner (1995), who analyze
the dynamic interaction of the monetary authorities of two symmetric countries.
We extend this two-country model to a setting of a monetary union, implying
centralized monetary policy. In addition, we consider the effects of ﬁscal sta-
bilization policy in such a setting of a monetary union and the effects of ﬁscal
stringency requirements. Finally, we introduce labor market adjustment and
institutions and study the effects of asymmetric structures of the labor market
institutions in the participating countries.
The macroeconomic model underlying our analysis is a much modiﬁed and
extended version of the familiar Mundell–Fleming model.4 A complete modeling
ofgoodsandlabormarketisundertaken, featuringpriceandwagerigiditiesand34 VAN AARLE ET AL.
rationing schemes. In this way, we can analyze dynamic adjustment processes
in the EMU and the role of macroeconomic policies therein.
We assume that the EMU consists of two countries, country 1 and country 2,
and has been fully implemented. This assumption implies that national cur-
rencies have been replaced by a common currency and national central banks
by the ECB (and hence that the exchange rate has disappeared as an adjust-
ment instrument). The capital markets are fully integrated, and we abstain from
any country-risk premium, implying that any nominal interest differential is ar-
bitraged away instantaneously.5 Furthermore, we assume that there is no labor
mobility between both EMU parts and that goods and labor markets adjust
sluggishly. Finally, we ignore the interaction of the EMU area with non-EMU
countries.6 The economic structure of the two-country EMU is given by the
following equations:
Country 1 Country 2
yd
1.t/ D ±1s.t/ ¡ °1r1.t/ C ½1y2.t/ C ´1 f1.t/. 1a/ yd
2.t/ D¡ ± 2s . t/¡° 2r 2. t/C½ 2y 1. t/C´ 2f 2. t/. 1b/
ys
1.t/ D Á1n1.t/. 2a/ ys
2.t/ D Á2n2.t/. 2b/
y1.t/ D minfyd
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2.t/; ys
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r 1 . t / D i E . t / ¡
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²
p2.t/. 5b/
mE.t/ ¡ pE.t/ D ·yE.t/ ¡ ¸iE.t/. 6 /
²
p 1 . t / D » 1 . y d
1 . t / ¡ y s




















p2.t/ ¡ ¾2u2.t/. 8b/
nd
1.t/ D¡ ¼ 1.w1.t/ ¡ p1.t// .9a/ nd
2.t/ D¡ ¼ 2.w2.t/ ¡ p2.t// .9b/
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n1.t/ D minfnd
1.t/;ns





1.t/. 12a/ u2.t/ D ns
2.t/ ¡ nd
2.t/. 12b/
where yi denotes real output of country i;i Df 1 ;2 gI pi, the output price level; ri,
the real interest rate; fi, the real ﬁscal deﬁcit that the ﬁscal authority of country
i chooses; wi, the nominal wage; ni, employment; and ui, the unemployment
rate. Moreover, s measures the competitiveness of country 1 vis-` a-vis country
2, since it is deﬁned as the output price differential. mE denotes the amount of
nominal balances of the common currency that the public holds, andiE denotes
the common nominal interest rate. All variables, except interest rates, are in
logarithms and expressed as deviations from steady-state. The superscript d
denotes demand, the superscript s supply. The price level and output in the
EMU are deﬁned as weighted averages of output prices and outputs of the two
countries, i.e., pE.t/ :D !p1.t/ C .1 ¡ !/p2.t/ and yE.t/ :D !y1.t/ C .1 ¡ !/y2.t/,
in which ! and 1 ¡ ! denote the relative sizes of the economies of country 1MACROECONOMIC POLICY INTERACTION UNDER EMU 35
and country 2 in the total EMU economy. All the parameters are assumed to be
nonnegative. A dot above a variable denotes its time derivative.
Except for the interest rates and the unemployment rates, all the variables are
inlogarithmsandareexpressedasdeviationsfromtheirlong-runnoninﬂationary
equilibrium. In the long run, the EMU countries converge to their long-run non-
inﬂationary equilibrium (growth path), where output is equal to its long-run equi-
libriumlevel(implyingthat y.1/andu.1/ D 0), whichisunaffectedbymonetary
and ﬁscal policies. So our model describes how, in the short and medium run,
macroeconomicadjustmenttakesplacetowardstheseequilibriumvalues. Note
also that in our model the ﬁscal deﬁcit is deﬁned as the cyclical deﬁcit compo-
nent, i.e., the deviation from the structural deﬁcit. The effects of a reduction in
the structural deﬁcit therefore fall outside the scope of our analysis: including
such structural changes in the ﬁscal deﬁcit would introduce nonlinearities in
our model and possibly dramatically affect our entire analysis.
Equation (1) gives the aggregate demand for goods as a function of intra-EU
competitiveness, the real interest rate, foreign output, and the ﬁscal deﬁcit. In
principle, we allow here for asymmetries in the transmission of ﬁscal policies
in both countries, since an important debate exists in the literature about such
asymmetries between countries in the transmission of ﬁscal policies (cf. the
recent discussion about Keynesian and non-Keynesian effects of ﬁscal consol-
idation). Equation (2) expresses the aggregate supply of goods as a function
of the amount of labor employed in the production process, where it has been
assumed in the model that the amount of capital remains at its equilibrium in
the short run. According to (3), actual output is rationed by the short side of the
goodsmarket. Theroleofrationingisalsopresentin(7),accordingtowhichout-
put prices adjust to some extent to any excess demand or supply in the goods
market. In addition, cost-push factors such as wage increases and increases
of foreign prices may affect domestic output prices. Equation (4) deﬁnes the
competitiveness of the EMU countries relative to each other. This intra-EU
competitiveness variable is one of the driving variables of the adjustment pro-
cesses in the EU economy. The deﬁnition of real interest rates is given in (5) as
the difference between the nominal interest rate and (expected) inﬂation.7 The
demand for the common currency is given by (6) and depends on output in the
currency union and the common interest rate. The money market is cleared by
the common interest rate such that money demand equals the supply of Euro
base money, mE, which is set by the ECB.
ThePhillipsmechanismisreﬂectedin(8), whichrelateswageinﬂationtoprice
changes and the unemployment rate u. The ﬁrst component reﬂects the price
compensation in wage formation, whereas the second component reﬂects the
moderating effect of unemployment on wage increases. We do not assume a
priori that there is full wage indexation .¹ D 1/. In principle, we also allow for
the case of imperfect indexation .¹ < 1/. The Keynesian Neoclassical synthesis
underlying our model causes nonneutral effects of imperfect indexation. In the
long run, the Phillips curves are vertical again, i.e., independent of the value36 VAN AARLE ET AL.
of ¹ or other structural model parameters. Labor demand, nd, according to
(9), is assumed to be negatively related to the real wage. Labor supply, ns,
according to (10), is a positive function of the real wage. Employment in (11) is
determined by a similar rationing scheme as in the goods market.8 The rate of
unemployment in (12), ﬁnally, equals the difference between labor supply and
labor demand.
Both economies are connected by a number of channels through which price
and output ﬂuctuations in one part transmit themselves to the other part of
the EMU. Output ﬂuctuations in both economies transmit themselves partly to
the other EMU part through the import channel. Therefore, the relative open-
ness to each other of both economies, as measured by ½i, creates an important
interdependency between both economies. Price differences between the for-
eign and domestic economy affect relative intra-EU competitiveness s.t/ and,
therefore, export demand in both economies. Also, through their effect on the
demand for the common currency in the common money market, output and
price ﬂuctuations in the domestic economy have repercussions on the foreign
economy. Moreover, domestic price ﬂuctuations are caused by both domestic
components—domestic excess demand and wage changes—and by foreign
prices.
ThecommonmonetarypolicyimplementedbytheECBandtheﬁscalpolicies
implemented by the national ﬁscal authorities affect real (output and employ-
ment) and nominal (prices and wages) adjustment in both economies through
thesevariousmacroeconomicinterdependencies.Theseinterdependenciesim-
ply that the ﬁscal authority of country 1, the ﬁscal authority of country 2, and
the ECB are involved in a dynamic game on macroeconomic stabilization in the
EMU.
Combining (1)–(12) yields, after some rewriting and under the absence of
a regime switch, the following ﬁrst-order, four-dimensional linear differential
equation, with as state variables the price level, pi.t/, and wages, wi.t/, in both
countries, and as control variables the policy instrument of the ECB, mE.t/, and
of the ﬁscal authorities in both countries, f1.t/ and f2.t/:
² x.t/ D Ax.t/C B1v1.t/C B2v2.t/C B3v3.t/;x.0/ D x0; (13)
y.t/ D Cx.t/CD1v1.t/CD2v2.t/CD3v3.t/; (14)





/; v1 :D f1;v 2 :D f2;v 3 :D mE, and y :D . y1
y2/. Having modeled
the economies of both EMU countries and having derived the adjustment dy-
namics of output and prices over time, we still need to determine the monetary
and ﬁscal policies and to derive their dynamic adjustment over time as a con-
sequence of the interaction between the macroeconomic policymakers. To do
so, we need to specify objective functions of the players. We assume that the
players have quadratic objective functions. Fiscal authorities are assumed to
care about stabilization of inﬂation, output, unemployment, and ﬁscal deﬁcitsMACROECONOMIC POLICY INTERACTION UNDER EMU 37



























®;¯, and Â are the relative weights that the ﬁscal authorities attach to output,
unemployment, and deﬁcit stabilization, respectively. µ measures the rate of
time preference. Inﬂation, output, and unemployment stabilization are stan-
dard arguments in the objective functions of macroeconomic policymakers.
The assumption that the ﬁscal authorities value a budget balance can reﬂect
the notion that high deﬁcits, while beneﬁcial to stimulate output, are not without
costs: these, to some extent, crowd out private investment and lead to debt
accumulation that has to be serviced in the future by lower government spend-
ing and higher taxes. Deﬁcits in the loss function also reﬂect the possibility
that excessive deﬁcits in the EMU will be subject to sanctions, as proposed in
the “Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure” of the Treaty of Maastricht on the European
Union (art. 104c) and its more recent extension into the Stability and Growth
Pact. Therefore, countries will prefer low ﬁscal deﬁcits to high deﬁcits.9
The ECB also features inﬂation and output objectives. In particular, we as-
sume that it cares about inﬂation,
² pE.t/, output, yE.t/, unemployment, and the














Also, in the case of monetary policy, we assume that policy activism is not with-
out costs and is therefore disliked by the ECB: in case ÂE > 0, higher monetary
policy activism—while beneﬁcial in stabilizing output and price ﬂuctuations—
entails welfare losses in itself. The ECB is not directly concerned with the level
of the ﬁscal deﬁcits. The ECB does care directly about the level of its own in-
strument, the common money supply, since the ECB dislikes changes from the
initial level. This could reﬂect costs associated with monetary policy activism,
as sometimes proposed in the monetary policy literature: other things being
equal, policymakers prefer a constant level of their instrument rather than to
undertake changes all the time.
We want to consider the dynamic stabilization game in the context of a sit-
uation where the European countries are in a recession. This situation implies
a negative output gap, i.e., yi.0/<0, and unemployment, i.e., ui.0/>0. Hence,
we need to analyze how policy instruments, output, and prices adjust over time
as a result of the dynamic interaction between macroeconomic policymakers
in the EMU. Also, it will be of interest to consider how the degree of ﬁscal
stringency and the asymmetric settings of both economies will affect macro-
economicstabilizationpoliciesandadjustment. Inthisdynamicinteraction, one38 VAN AARLE ET AL.
can consider a number of different strategic and informational concepts. We
restrict ourselves here to the Nash strategy, where players act noncooperatively
and implement their equilibrium strategy simultaneously using feedback infor-
mation patterns (i.e., the feedback Nash equilibrium) versus the cooperative
Nash bargaining solution. In the latter, the noncooperative Nash equilibrium is
featured as the strategic fallback position to which players turn in case cooper-
ation breaks down. The next section gives a more detailed theoretical analysis
and derives the feedback Nash and Nash bargaining equilibrium strategies in
the linear quadratic setting.
2. Some theoretical issues
In the preceding section, we have deﬁned a problem in which three parties
(henceforth called players) try to minimize their individual quadratic perfor-
mance criterion subject to a linear dynamic system. First, consider the case in
which the players act noncooperatively, and assume that each player plays a
Nash strategy, that is, no player can improve his outcome by altering his de-
cision unilaterally. We focus on feedback Nash strategies in the case of linear
system dynamics and quadratic objectives of the players. In this case, the in-
formation available to the individual players consists of the initial state and the
current state of the game (memoryless perfect state information). This implies
that the proposed policy in the feedback case is strongly time consistent—that
is, the players have no reason at any future stage of the game to deviate from
the adopted policy, even if there have been deviations in the past from the
actions dictated by the original policy. An equilibrium concept that has these
requirements is the feedback Nash equilibrium deﬁned by, e.g., Starr and Ho
(1969) and Ba¸ sar and Olsder (1999). Since, according to this equilibrium con-
cept, the players can react to the policies of the other players at any stage, its
economic relevance is usually believed to be larger than that of the open-loop
Nash equilibrium concept, where the players determine their optimal policy at
the beginning of the planning period and stick to these policies throughout the
planning period.
From (13) we have that each player controls a different set of inputs to a
single system, described by a differential equation. The general structure of
the system we consider is as follows:
P x D Ax C B1v1 C B2v2 C B3v3; x.0/ D x0; (17)
where x isthen-dimensionalstateofthesystem; vi isanm-dimensional(control)
vector that player i can manipulate; x0 is the initial state of the system; and A,
B1, B2, and B3 are constant matrices of appropriate dimensions.
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is semipositive deﬁnite, Kif is semipositive deﬁnite, and Rii is positive deﬁnite,















The theoretical problem analyzed in this section is to ﬁnd a feedback Nash equi-
librium of the game sketched above. With respect to this game, a number of
additional remarks must be made. First, in the literature, Fi is usually assumed
to be diagonal. However, our study requires the analysis of a generalized per-
formance criterion involving cross-terms as well. Note that cross-terms directly
show up here. To illustrate: note that output in country 1 is directly inﬂuenced
by output in country 2 (and vice versa); see (1a). Therefore, if ﬁscal authorities
in country 1 are concerned about output in their country, they are indirectly also
concerned about output in country 2; see (1b). The more output in country 1 is
inﬂuenced by output in country 2, the more the authorities prefer active stabi-
lization policies in country 2. Such effects are represented by the off-diagonal
submatrices in matrix Fi. Note that cross-terms directly show up when one
derives (18) from (15) and (16). The diagonal submatrix R21 measures, e.g., how
strongly player 1 is concerned about player 2 pursuing a ﬁscal disequilibrium
strategy (see also Fershtman et al., 1987).
Another remark concerns the chosen length of the planning horizon. Often,
in the literature, the considered length is chosen inﬁnite. From a computational
pointofview, itisusuallyeasiertocalculateandanalyzetheequilibriumstrategy
for the inﬁnite than for a ﬁnite planning horizon. However, as shown by Weeren
et al. (1999) in a study of the scalar two-player case with an inﬁnite planning
horizon (see also Engwerda, 2000), multiple feedback Nash equilibria can occur
that all stabilize the closed-loop system. In addition, the dynamic stability
of the equilibria was studied in Weeren et al. (1999), and it turned out that
there are no arguments to discriminate between these equilibria. Given this40 VAN AARLE ET AL.
basic problem, we restrict ourselves here to an analysis of the ﬁnite planning-
horizon problem, where we choose the length of the planning horizon such
that the corresponding equilibrium policy becomes virtually independent of t f.
Consequently, theappropriatefeedbackstrategiesusedintheanalysisbecome
stationary. Obviously, this property cannot be guaranteed a priori, and it would
be nice to have some a priori arguments from which one could conclude this
property beforehand. The analysis of this question, however, goes beyond the
scope of the present article and is therefore ignored here. Furthermore, we
assume that the planning horizon is so long that the discounted utility at the
end of the planning horizon is negligible. So, the Kif are chosen to be zero
.i D 1;2;3/.
In our analysis, the following set of coupled, symmetric, Riccati-type differ-
ential equations plays a crucial role:
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Due to the assumption of invertibility of G, we can prove the following theorem
(see the Appendix):
Theorem 1. The linear quadratic differential game (17)–(18) has a feedback-
Nash equilibrium for every initial state whenever the set of Riccati differential
equations (21) has a solution. Moreover, the equilibrium strategy is then given
by (22).
NotethatexistenceofasolutionofthesetofRiccatidifferentialequations(21)
is only a sufﬁcient condition to conclude that the ﬁnite planning horizon has aMACROECONOMIC POLICY INTERACTION UNDER EMU 41
solution. Moreover, the invertibility assumption is made in order to simplify the
analysis. In case this assumption is not made, one should proceed along the
lines of Ba¸ sar and Olsder (1999, pp. 322–333) to ﬁnd the equilibrium strategies.
Once we have obtained the feedback Nash equilibrium, this noncooperative
solution can be used as a threatpoint in an axiomatic bargaining situation. In
the literature, several axiomatic solutions are proposed in which the egalitarian
solution, the Nash bargaining solution, and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution are
the most popular ones. As suggested by Douven (1995), we choose the Nash
bargaining solution because it allows for an interpretation of the bargaining
weights in terms of relative bargaining power, and it also allows for the maxi-
mization of gains from cooperation.10 From axiomatic bargaining theory,11 we
know that the Nash bargaining solution is the unique solution satisfying Pareto
optimality, anonymity(whichmeansthatthesolutionisindependentofthename
of the players), scale invariance, and multilateral stability. Multilateral stability
means that the Nash bargaining solution has the property that if one player
gets his Nash payoff and the remaining players have to negotiate again on the
outcome of the game, then the outcome of this subproblem will be the same
for these players as they would have obtained in the original game.
To determine this Nash bargaining solution, we ﬁrst show how any Pareto-
efﬁcient strategy can be calculated. To that end, we introduce a new factoriza-
tion of matrix Fi. Let
Qc
i :D Qi; Sc

























Since our performance criteria Ji are convex, by the supporting hyperplane the-
orem, every Pareto-efﬁcient cost vector J¤ is associated with a vector of pos-
itive weights Ã.with
P3
iD1 Ãi D1/ such that J¤ D minf
P3
iD1 Ãi Jig. Consequently,
we can use the standard linear quadratic regulator theory to ﬁnd the set of all
cooperative equilibrium strategies. Using the results from, e.g., chapter 16 of
Lancaster and Rodman (1995) we have the following:
Theorem 2. Theequilibriumstrategycorrespondingwiththecooperativebar-
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where B :D .B1 B2 B3/I RÃ :D
P3
iD1 ÃiRc
i I SÃ :D
P3
iD1 ÃiSc
i ; and M is the solution
of the Riccati differential equation,
²
M.t/ D Q AT M.t/ C M.t/ Q A ¡ M.t/BR
¡1
Ã BTM.t/C Q QI M.tf/ D 0: (24)
Here Q A :D A¡BR
¡1
Ã ST






Ã. The corresponding min-
imal total performance costs are xT.0/M.0/x.0/.
Note that we made the assumption in this theorem that the terminal costs in
the performance criteria are zero (i.e., Kif D0). Furthermore, the general for-
mulation of this theorem presupposes that some regularity conditions are met
(e.g., the invertibility of RÃ). Since these conditions are met in our case, we
choose not to state them explicitly here. In general, the Nash bargaining solu-
tioncanbeidentiﬁedwiththepointontheParetofrontieratwhichtheproductof
the differences between the Pareto optimal losses and the losses at the Nash
threatpoint is maximized. In particular, this implies the following equivalent
characterization (for a proof, see, e.g., Douven, 1995, Appendix A.2).
Theorem 3. At the Nash bargaining solution, the following relationship holds
between the individual losses of the players, denoted by J NB
i ; the threatpoint
d, with components di; and the uniquely determined corresponding bargaining


















This relationship is exploited in the next algorithm to ﬁnd the Nash bargaining
solution.
Algorithm 1. Determination of the Nash bargaining solution
Step 1: (initialization) Calculate the individual performance criteria under the
feedback Nash equilibrium strategy. Denote these performances by di.
Choose Ãi D 1
3.
Step 2: Compute the with Ãi corresponding equilibrium strategy, according to
Theorem 2, and the associated individual performances. Denote these by J¤
i .
Step 3: Check whether, for all i, the inequalities J¤
i · di are satisﬁed. If not,
then there is an i0 for which J¤
i0 > di0. In that case, update Ãi0 :D Ãi0 C 0:01,












:MACROECONOMIC POLICY INTERACTION UNDER EMU 43
Step 5: If jÃN
i ¡ Ãij < 0:01, i D 1;2;3, then terminate the algorithm and set
ÃNB DÃN. Else Ãi :D 0:8Ãi C0:2ÃN
i ; recalculate the J¤
i ’s and return to Step 2.
Step 3 is used to make sure that we always start in the bargaining set, i.e.,
the set where for all players J¤
i is to be preferred over di. If we were to skip this
step, we could be stuck with a nonadmissible Ã in Step 4. Finally, in Step 5,
we use the update Ãi :D 0:8Ãi C0:2ÃN
i instead of the more intuitively appealing
update Ãi :D ÃN
i . This is to prevent too large steps in the update process,
which again might result in a vector Ã for which the inequalities J¤
i · di might
no longer be satisﬁed. Up to now, we do not have a proof that this algorithm
always converges. In our simulation study, however, the algorithm worked
well, and convergence was obtained in quite a few iterations. An alternative
approach to calculate the Nash bargaining solutions is to maximize directly the
product of the gains over the noncooperative Nash case. Douven (1995) ﬁnds,
however, that the algorithm described above is faster and more reliable than
this traditional method.
3. A simulation study
Thevariablesintheobjectivefunctions Ji;i Df 1 ;2 ;Eg , canberewritteninterms
of the state variables and the instruments. Before we can ﬁnd the equilibrium
of the dynamic stabilization game, we ﬁrst have to rewrite model (13)–(16) as a
standardthree-playergamecorrespondingwith(17)–(19). Tothatend,introduce
Q x.t/ :D e¡ 1
2µtx.t/; Q y.t/ :D e¡ 1
2µty.t/ and Q v.t/ :D e¡1
2µtvi.t/. We see that the above
minimization problems (13)–(17) can be rewritten as
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Q x C B1Q v1.t/ C B2Q v2.t/ C B3Q v3.t/; Q x.0/ D x0:
We can now readily apply the analytical apparatus developed in Section 3 to
the dynamic game between the ﬁscal players and the ECB on macroeconomic
stabilization in the EMU. We concentrate on numerical simulation of a speciﬁc
example. Obviously, this implies that the exact numerical outcomes are spe-
ciﬁc to the numerical values of the model parameters that are chosen. However,
we are more interested in the general adjustment patterns that are generated.
The linearity of the model and a rough sensitivity analysis suggest that the gen-
eral picture of macroeconomic adjustment provided by our example is indeed
representative.44 VAN AARLE ET AL.
The model enables us to consider adjustment in a considerable number of
macroeconomic settings. In particular, we distinguish between (1) a symmetric
case in which all model parameters are the same in both countries and (2) an
asymmetric case where countries differ in some structural model parameters.
In particular, we focus on asymmetries with reference to labor market char-
acteristics, namely, asymmetries with reference to wage indexation and labor
market ﬂexibility. These asymmetries and their possible consequences appear
to be the most relevant in the context of macroeconomic adjustment under
EMU. Furthermore, we distinguish between (1) a noncooperative policy regime
and (2) a cooperative policy regime. In the latter regime, the national ﬁscal
policies and the common monetary policy of the ECB are coordinated. Finally,
because of the disequilibrium analysis we used in modeling labor and goods
market adjustments, a distinction can be made between (1) a (Neo-) Classical
unemployment regime and (2) a Keynesian unemployment regime. As we will
see, all these different cases will have considerable effects on macroeconomic
adjustment and macroeconomic policy design in the EMU.
We use the following values for the structural model parameters in the sym-
metric case that will serve as our basic reference point: °i D0:2;± iD0:3;½ i D
0:3;´ i D 1;· D 1;¸ D 0:1;» i D 0:25;º i D 0:7;³ i D 0:8;¹ i D 0:9;¾ i D 0:2;¼ i D
0:7;¿ i D0;Á i D0:75;!D0:5, and µ D 0:1. Concerning the preference weights
in the objective functions of the players, the following values have been as-
sumed: ®1 D ®2 D 1:5;®E D 0:6;¯ 1 D ¯ 2 D 3;¯E D 0;Â 1 D Â 2 D 0:8;ÂE D 0:5.
In this case, the ECB’s primary focus is price stability, and a lower weight is
attached to output stabilization. Instrument stability also carries some weight.
The ﬁscal authorities are primarily concerned with output and (un)employment
stabilization but face constraints on the use of their instruments.
Of crucial importance for the dynamic adjustment in the EMU are also the
initial values of the state variables of the model, which will determine the initial
type of disequilibrium that countries face. We assume that the EMU starts in a
situation of wages and prices at disequilibrium levels: p1.0/ D p2.0/ D 0:005 and
wi.0/ D w2.0/ D 0:01. In that case, an initial excess supply in the labor market
and an initial excess demand in the goods market result. In the literature on
disequilibrium theory, this outcome is generally known as the Classical unem-
ployment regime. Figure 1 displays the adjustment of output, prices, wages,
unemployment,competitiveness,ﬁscaldeﬁcits,andthecommonmoneysupply
that results in this symmetric base-case scenario.
Adjustment in the feedback Nash case is indicated by solid lines. Adjustment
in the Nash bargaining equilibrium is given by dotted lines and is shown as a
basic reference for outcomes in the cooperative case. In this symmetric set-
ting, macroeconomic adjustment in both countries is also symmetric. The initial
disequilibrium level of prices and nominal wages depresses output and em-
ployment signiﬁcantly. Adjustment forces, however, are activated by this initial
disequilibrium in goods and labor markets. With aggregate demand exceeding
aggregate supply of goods and unemployment in the labor markets, prices andMACROECONOMIC POLICY INTERACTION UNDER EMU 45
Figure 1. Base scenario; Classical regime.46 VAN AARLE ET AL.
wages start to adjust downward towards their equilibrium values. Real wages
decrease, which fosters output and employment adjustment towards equilib-
rium. The initial adjustment for the real variables (output and employment) is
(slightly) higher in the cooperative case than in the noncooperative case. After
t D 20, adjustment is, however, faster in the noncooperative case.
Under the Classical unemployment regime, monetary and ﬁscal policies have
only effects on output and employment via price and wage adjustment. The
common money supply is expanded to stimulate real wage adjustment: the
implied higher inﬂation depresses real wages if indexation is imperfect. In the
Nash bargaining case as well, the ﬁscal authorities implement an expansionary
policy and share in the adjustment burden. In the noncooperative feedback
Nash case, however, a contractionary ﬁscal policy is chosen as the ﬁscal autho-
rities attempt to shift the adjustment burden to the ECB. The low effectiveness
and the direct costs—as reﬂected by the weight Â in the loss functions of the
policymakers—from active stabilization policies restrain the policymakers from
pursuing very active stabilization policies, and we see that the policy impulses
remain modest. We will come back to this issue in the ﬁnal example we study.
In the ﬁrst (I) line of Table 1, we indicate the welfare losses that result in
the noncooperative .JNash/ and cooperative .JNB/ cases, and the bargaining
weights .ÃNB/ in the cooperative decision making on monetary and ﬁscal poli-
cies.
By deﬁnition, policy coordination reduces the welfare losses since external-
ities from individual policies are internalized in the cooperative case and not
ignored as in the noncooperative case. Obviously, in this symmetric case, the
bargaining weights in the individual countries are equal. The ECB’s bargaining
weight turns out to be more than double the bargaining weight of an individual
country. In the Classical regime with excess demand in the goods market and
with limited effects of ﬁscal and monetary policies on real variables, the gains
from policy coordination are also limited, as Table 1 indicates.
Strong effects result from a change in the labor market parameters. Figure 2
gives the adjustment patterns that result in the symmetric case if ¾ increases
from0.2to0.8,implyingthatwagesreactmuchmorestronglytounemployment.
A higher degree of wage ﬂexibility increases the adjustment capacity of the
economies. Within 10 periods, all adjustment has virtually been achieved,
whereas in the base case this occurred only after 25 periods, which also in-
dicates the importance of the ﬂexibility of the labor market. Wages, unemploy-
ment, and output adjust considerably faster than in the base case of Figure 1
because of the improved ﬂexibility of the labor market. The ﬁscal and monetary
policy strategies remain very similar to those observed in the base case. Ac-
cording to the second (II) line of Table 1, higher labor market ﬂexibility in the
EMU entails considerable welfare gains both under noncooperative and coop-
erative macroeconomic policy design. From this perspective, it is interesting to
note that currently, in various EU countries, attempts to reform labor markets
and institutions are undertaken that aim at increasing the ﬂexibility of the laborMACROECONOMIC POLICY INTERACTION UNDER EMU 47
Figure 2. More ﬂexible labor markets .¾1 D ¾2 D 0:8/; Classical regime.48 VAN AARLE ET AL.
Table 1. Noncooperative .JNASH/ and cooperative
costs .JNB/ (both times 10¡5) and relative bargaining
power .ÃNB/ in the Nash bargaining solutions
Case Country 1 Country 2 ECB
I JNASH 11.21 11.21 1.19
JNB 10.97 10.97 1.07
ÃNB 0.239 0.239 0.520
II JNASH 4.30 4.30 3.62
JNB 4.03 4.03 3.36
ÃNB 0.326 0.326 0.348
III JNASH 11.56 19.88 0.92
JNB 11.13 16.34 0.69
ÃNB 0.338 0.041 0.622
IV JNASH 11.03 4.44 2.22
JNB 10.76 4.17 2.03
ÃNB 0.292 0.285 0.423
V JNASH 85.80 85.80 71.33
JNB 71.95 71.95 70.00
ÃNB 0.081 0.081 0.838
VI JNASH 70.49 70.49 18.33
JNB 28.74 28.74 11.57
ÃNB 0.1211 0.1211 0.7579
Note: Case I, baseline scenario; Case II, higher wage
ﬂexibility .¾1 D¾2 D0:2/; Case III, asymmetry in the
wage indexation parameter .¹1 D0:9;¹ 2D0:1/; Case
IV, asymmetry in wage ﬂexibility .¾1 D 0:2;¾ 2 D0:8/;
Case V, Keynesian unemployment; Case VI, more
ﬁscal and less monetary ﬂexibility .Â1 D Â2 D 0:8;
ÂE D 3:5/.
market. In the cooperative case, higher ﬂexibility of the labor market increases
the bargaining weight of the ﬁscal players at the cost of the ECB.
Havingfocusedsofaronthesymmetriccase, wenowturntoasymmetricset-
tings. In particular, we focus on asymmetries of labor market institutions and
their consequences for macroeconomic adjustment and policies, since these
are generally assumed to be the most signiﬁcant in the context of EMU. Figure 3
gives adjustment in the presence of an asymmetry in the wage indexation
parameter ¹. We assume that wages in country 1 are indexed to a much larger
extent than in country 2, ¹1 D 0:9 (as before in the symmetric case of Figure 1),
and ¹2 D 0:1.
This assumption produces considerable asymmetries in the adjustment of
both countries. Country 1 displays a quicker adjustment of wages, prices,
output, and employment than country 2, particularly under noncooperativeMACROECONOMIC POLICY INTERACTION UNDER EMU 49
Figure 3. Asymmetric wage indexation .¹1 D 0:9;¹ 2 D0:1/; Classical regime.50 VAN AARLE ET AL.
policies. Country 1 is more competitive than country 2 over the complete ad-
justment period, in particular during the ﬁrst half of it. For country 2, it also
becomes more important whether noncooperative or cooperative macroeco-
nomic policy design prevails, as the larger difference in welfare losses between
bothpolicyregimesandaverylowbargainingweightinthethird(III)lineofTable
1 indicate. Relatively large cooperation gains can be established for country 2
and for the ECB.
Even stronger are the effects from the second labor market asymmetry that
we analyze in Figure 4. We assume in this second asymmetric case that the
countries are symmetric, except that the labor market of country 2 is consi-
derably more ﬂexible than that of country 1, since we assume that ¾1 D 0:2 and
¾2 D 0:8.
In this case, the labor market in country 2 reacts much more strongly to
unemployment than in country 1. Wages, unemployment, prices, and output
adjust much more slowly in country 1, resulting in a considerable difference
in welfare losses between the two countries, according to the fourth (IV) line
of Table 1. Competitiveness of country 1 remains negative over the entire ad-
justment cycle. This simulation in particular suggests the importance of labor
market ﬂexibility—and possible asymmetries therein—for macroeconomic ad-
justment in the EMU. The last two examples with asymmetric settings also
support the ﬁnding of Hughes Hallett and Ma (1996) that asymmetries tend
to increase the scope for policy cooperation: for all players, the asymmet-
ric cases display larger gains from cooperation than in the symmetric base
case.
Until now, the simulations started with an initial disequilibrium that resulted
in output being supply side determined both initially and during the remainder
of the adjustment. In this case, policies basically only inﬂuence adjustment
to the extent that they foster real wage adjustment. Also, we found that the
issue of whether macroeconomic policies were coordinated or not did not have
a strong impact, except perhaps in the case where the economies are less
indexed. A different and potentially stronger role for macroeconomic policies
and their coordination results, however, if output is demand determined. In
that case, policies can directly inﬂuence output and employment.12 The next
two cases consider such a demand-determined regime in the goods market.
The initial wages and prices are now below their long-run equilibrium .w1.0/ D
w2.0/ D¡ 0 : 005; p1.0/ D p2.0/ D¡ 0 : 01/, entailing Keynesian unemployment and
excess supply of goods. Figure 5 gives adjustment in the base case but with
this set of initial price and wage levels.13
In this demand regime, monetary and ﬁscal policies have a stronger impact
on the adjustment, since they directly control aggregate demand for goods
and thereby employment. The ﬁscal authorities who care in particular for out-
put and unemployment stabilization undertake a signiﬁcant expansionary ﬁscal
impulse. The ECB, on the other hand, which is very concerned about price sta-
bility, implementsamonetarycontractiontolimitthepriceincreases, evenifthisMACROECONOMIC POLICY INTERACTION UNDER EMU 51
Figure 4. ¾1 D 0:2;¾ 2 D0:8, asymmetric wage ﬂexibility; Classical regime.52 VAN AARLE ET AL.
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Figure 6. More ﬁscal and less monetary ﬂexibility; Keynesian regime.54 VAN AARLE ET AL.
contraction hampers output and unemployment growth. This considerable dif-
ference in relative preferences also implies that cooperation has limited effects
in this example: the more similar players are in their preferences, of course, the
greater becomes the scope for effective policy cooperation.
Compared to the Classical regimes of Figures 1–4, the bargaining weight of
the ECB has considerably increased—to the disadvantage of the ﬁscal autho-
rities, as indicated in the ﬁfth (V) line of Table 1. Note also the larger welfare
losses in the Keynesian unemployment regime as compared with the Classical
unemployment regime. These costs result in particular because of the much
higher degree of policy activism in the Keynesian regime. Note also, however,
that the direct comparison of welfare losses across both regimes is not valid in
a strict sense, since we are comparing two fundamentally different macroeco-
nomic regimes, e.g., macroeconomic policies are more powerful in the Keyne-
sian regime.
Figure 6 gives the adjustment for the case in which the ﬁscal and monetary
ﬂexibility parameters are changed. Â1 and Â2 are decreased from 0.8 to 0.25,
implying that ﬁscal policy activism is much less restricted by ﬁscal stringency
requirements and less costly for the authorities. ÂE is increased from 0.5 to 3.5,
making monetary policy activism more costly for the ECB.
As indicated in Section 2, we interpret the ﬁscal ﬂexibility parameter as a
stylized representation of the Stability and Growth Pact. A lower value of Â1;2 in
this interpretation implies a less strict interpretation of the Stability and Growth
Pact. The higher degree of ﬁscal ﬂexibility enables the ﬁscal authorities to exer-
cise more ﬁscal policy activism. Accordingly, ﬁscal deﬁcits are expanded more
in the feedback case and in the Nash bargaining case. The lower monetary
ﬂexibility implies here that the ECB implements a less restrictive monetary pol-
icy as before. This reduces the adjustment burden for the ﬁscal policymakers.
Consequently, the welfare losses given in line (VI) of Table 1 are considerably
lower (compared with the base case of the Keynesian regime in line (V)), both
for the ﬁscal authorities who face a smaller adjustment effort and even for
the ECB, which has less instrument costs, since it is more costly to imple-
ment a sharp monetary contraction. The new bargaining weights imply that the
more ﬂexible ﬁscal players gain inﬂuence in the cooperative decision-making
problem.
4. Conclusions
The EMU combines a centralized monetary policy with decentralized ﬁscal
policies. Fiscal stringency requirements are introduced to reduce negative
spillovers that could result from excessive deﬁcits. In such a setting, many
complications are likely to arise when macroeconomic stabilization policies are
designed in the EMU. This article has characterized the problem of macro-
economic stabilization under EMU as a dynamic game between the ECB and
national ﬁscal authorities. Using a dynamic game approach, we have analyzedMACROECONOMIC POLICY INTERACTION UNDER EMU 55
how the monetary policy of the ECB and national ﬁscal policies interact and are
transmitted. We have focused on the feedback Nash and the Nash bargaining
equilibria of this dynamic game, where the optimal strategies of the players
are implemented simultaneously and in a noncooperative and cooperative way,
respectively. Moreover, we have analyzed how a looser and a stricter inter-
pretation of the monetary and ﬁscal stringency requirements of the Maastricht
Treaty affects macroeconomic outcomes in the EMU. The analysis has also pro-
vided insights into the effects of labor market conditions on macroeconomic
outcomes under EMU.
More speciﬁcally, we have simulated optimal noncooperative and coopera-
tive solutions divided over six scenarios: four scenarios in a supply-determined
Classical unemployment environment and two in a demand-determined
Keynesian unemployment environment. Under the Classical unemployment
regime, monetary and ﬁscal policies have only indirect effects on output and
employment via price and wage adjustments. Expansionary monetary and ﬁs-
cal policies increase excess demand and thereby price adjustment. Real wages
are affected if indexation is imperfect, which fosters output and employment
adjustment towards equilibrium. Common for the Classical unemployment
scenarios is that the (noncooperative) feedback Nash strategy selects a con-
tractionary ﬁscal policy as the national ﬁscal authorities attempt to shift the
adjustment burden to the ECB, while the Nash bargaining strategy selects an
expansionary ﬁscal policy where the ﬁscal authorities are prepared to share in
theadjustmentburden.TheﬁrsttwoClassicalunemploymentscenariosconsid-
ered symmetric cases: a base scenario and a labor market ﬂexibility scenario
with a more efﬁcient functioning of the Phillips mechanism. The other two Clas-
sical unemployment scenarios have considered two labor market asymmetries:
one with an asymmetric wage indexation scheme and one with asymmetric
wage ﬂexibility characteristics between the two countries. We have shown that
labor market institutions and possible asymmetries in labor market institutions
will have a very strong role on adjustment in the EMU if this Classical regime
prevails. The issue of policy coordination and ﬂexibility, while nontrivial, is of
secondary importance in those cases (except for the national ﬁscal deﬁcits, the
common money supply, and intra-EU competitiveness).
Finally, the last two scenarios have investigated symmetric Keynesian unem-
ployment regimes. In this rationing regime, monetary and ﬁscal policies have
direct effects on output and employment. This outcome implies stronger ef-
fects from macroeconomic stabilization policies and stronger welfare effects
of lack of coordination and/or ﬂexibility of macroeconomic policies. We have
concentrated on a situation with a very inﬂation-averse ECB and with ﬁscal
authorities who are mainly concerned with output and employment stability.
In that case, the Keynesian regime is potentially vulnerable to serious policy
conﬂicts between monetary and ﬁscal authorities in the EMU: a contractionary
monetary policy of the ECB increases the burden for the ﬁscal authorities to
stabilize output and employment. Expansionary ﬁscal policies, on the other56 VAN AARLE ET AL.
hand, increase the burden of inﬂation stabilization for the ECB. We have ana-
lyzed how policy cooperation and restrictions on monetary and ﬁscal policy
activism can be used to alleviate such macroeconomic policy conﬂicts in the
EMU.
Two important aspects are not incorporated into the analysis: (1) We do
not analyze the case where ﬁscal authorities coordinate their ﬁscal policies
internally. The question can be raised as to what extent ﬁscal coordination by
itself can already produce the gains from full policy coordination in the EMU.
(2) We disregard the interaction with countries outside the EMU area. Adding
this aspect will give more insight into the effects of the interaction of the EMU
area with the rest of the world—and in particular the effects of ﬂuctuations in
the Euro exchange rate on macroeconomic adjustment and policy design in the
EMU. Note, however, that the E(M)U economy as a whole, like that of the U.S, is
a relatively closed economy, i.e., intra-EU trade and interaction dominate extra-
EU trade and interaction. Adding such an external dimension to our analysis
may change the incentives to coordinate stabilization policies in two ways:
ﬁrstly, policy coordination inside the EMU can be helpful to deal with external
effects; and secondly, the effectiveness of the ﬁscal and monetary policies is
likely to be less in the presence of an external sector. These aspects are left
for future research and may modify a number of conclusions from the current
analysis.
5. Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1 on the feedback Nash equilibrium
Proof of Theorem 1:
Consider the minimum cost-to-go from any initial state N x and any initial time t,
as described by the so-called value function
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with boundary condition Vi.t f; N x/ D 1
2xT Kifx. It is well known (see, e.g., Ba¸ sar
and Olsder, 1999, p. 243) that if there exists a continuously differentiable func-














subject to the boundary condition Vi.t f;x/ D 1
2xT Kifx, then the pointwise min-
imization on the right-hand side of this equation (28) generates the optimalMACROECONOMIC POLICY INTERACTION UNDER EMU 57
strategy. Now, assume Vi.x;t/ D 1
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Differentiation of the bracketed term with reference to vi yields the next three
equations:
xT P1 C vT




1 C xT K1B1 D 0;
xT L2 C vT
1 N2 C vT
2 R22 C vT
3 V T
2 C xT K2B2 D 0; (30)
xT S3 C vT
1 T3 C vT
2 V3 C vT
3 R33 C xT K3B3 D 0:

























Substitution of these expressions into (13) yields then the advertised set of cou-
pled Riccati differential equations. Note that at this stage we only considered
the plausibility of the presented formulae. To provide a formal proof of the theo-
rem, one can proceed in a manner similar to, e.g., Ba¸ sar and Olsder (1999), pp.
328–329.
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Notes
1. The Stability and Growth Pact speciﬁes the details of the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure of the
MaastrichtTreaty.AnannualfallinrealGDPof2%ormoreisconsideredanexceptionallysevere58 VAN AARLE ET AL.
downturn, and the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio can be above the 3% limit as long as a recession of this
magnitude persists (although it must remain close to the reference value). If the decline in real
GDP is between 0.75% and 2%, an exception can also be invoked if the Council of Ministers
concurs.
2. In Engwerda et al. (1998, 1999), open-loop strategies were assumed that are computationally
more accessible but admittedly less realistic than feedback strategies as a characterization of
macroeconomic policy design.
3. Deeper aspects of the labor market, such as institutional features like social security, minimum
wage regulation, structural skill mismatches, and active labor market programs that together
determine structural unemployment, are disregarded in our analysis.
4. See,e.g.,McKibbinandSachs(1991)andWhitley(1992)foradetaileddiscussiononmotivation,
methodology, and structure of macroeconom(etr)ic multicountry models that are based on the
Mundell–Fleming model.
5. Given our focus on short-run macroeconomic stabilization in the EMU, our analysis ignores
issues of intertemporal solvency and the associated possibility of risk premia. Note also
that the introduction of government debt dynamics and risk premia would imply intrinsically
nonlinear dynamics in the model, in which case we could not apply the technical apparatus of
linear quadratic (LQ) differential game theory.
6. As noted by the referee, these simplifying assumptions impose important limitations on our
analysis and may therefore lead to biases in its conclusions. For example, the growth effect
of the fall in the Euro versus outside countries in its ﬁrst two years is not present in the model.
This fall may also have been fostered by a lack of coordination between monetary and ﬁscal
policies in the Euro area. Ignoring this fall may exaggerate the importance attributed by the
model to coordination.
7. Real interest in both EMU countries can therefore differ during the adjustment to long-run
equilibria. Inﬂation expectations are rational—which implies, in the presence of uncertainty in
the model, that all agents are endowed with perfect foresight.
8. These rationing schemes in the goods and labor markets are taken from the New Keynesian
disequilibrium theory, initiated by Dr` eze (1975), B￿ enassy (1975), and Malinvaud (1977). See,
e.g., German (1985) and Picard (1993) for a detailed overview of disequilibrium theory and
dynamics.
9. A very detailed analysis of the procedures, motivations, and implications of the Stability and
Growth Pact is given by Buti et al. (1997) and Eichengreen (1997), who suggest it might suc-
cessfully deliver at the same time sufﬁcient ﬁscal discipline and ﬁscal ﬂexibility.
10. Note that we do not allow for coalition formation or side payments in this case of policy
cooperation.
11. See, e.g., Lensberg (1988), Theorem 3.
12. This traditional role of monetary and ﬁscal policies as demand management policies and in
the context of the EMU is the focus of Engwerda et al. (1999).
13. The set of model parameters underlying Figure 5 is therefore the same as the one underlying
Figure 1.
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